Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence
Product Code:
9781502738950
ISBN13:
9781502738950
Condition:
New
$15.75
Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence
$15.75
Across many forms of rent seeking contests, the impact of risk aversion on equilibrium play is indeterminate. We design an experiment to compare individuals' decisions across three contests which are isomorphic under risk-neutrality, but are typically not isomorphic under other risk preferences. The pattern of individual play across our contests is not consistent with a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for any distribution of risk preferences. We show that replacing the Bayes-Nash equilibrium concept with the quintal response equilibrium, along with heterogeneous risk preferences can produce equilibrium patterns of play that are very similar to the patterns we observe.
| Author: Federal Trade Commission |
| Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform |
| Publication Date: Oct 07, 2014 |
| Number of Pages: 32 pages |
| Binding: Paperback or Softback |
| ISBN-10: 1502738953 |
| ISBN-13: 9781502738950 |
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